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Abstract 
One goal of the public employment service is to facilitate matching between unem-
ployed job seekers and job vacancies; another goal is to monitor job search so as to 
bring search efforts among the unemployed in line with search requirements. The 
referral of job seekers to vacancies is one instrument used for these purposes. We report 
results from a randomized Swedish experiment where the outcome of referrals is 
examined. To what extent do unemployed individuals actually apply for the jobs they 
are referred to? Does information to job seekers about increased monitoring affect the 
probability of applying and the probability of leaving unemployment? The experiment 
indicates that a relatively large fraction (one third) of the referrals do not result in job 
applications. Information about intensified monitoring causes an increase in the 
probability of job application, especially among young people. However, we find no 
significant impact on the duration of unemployment.  
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1 Introduction 
The referral of unemployed job seekers to job vacancies is key instrument whereby the 
public employment service (PES) attempts to facilitate the matching between job 
seekers and vacancies. This instrument is also used as a device to monitor job search, 
thereby reducing the moral hazard problems in unemployment insurance. A job seeker 
who fails to apply for a job that he is referred to runs a risk of being sanctioned, i.e., 
being exposed to a benefit withdrawal or a benefit reduction. However, a credible threat 
of a benefit sanction requires that PES gathers and uses information on whether referrals 
lead to actual job applications.  
Our study focuses on vacancy referrals in Sweden, a country well known for its 
ambitious active labor market policies. The vacancy referral process is a key ingredient 
of these policies. A vacancy referral involves a formal letter to the job seeker where a 
particular vacancy is identified. The letter states explicitly that the job seeker should 
apply for the vacancy and that failure to do so can result in a reduction or withdrawal of 
unemployment benefits. The annual flow of referrals via PES has amounted to some 
13–18 percent relative to the labor force (AMS, 2007a). A referral should take place 
when the PES administrator has found a job that is “suitable” to the job seeker. The 
suitability criterion is a bit vague but attempts to prevent “excessive” search for jobs 
where the qualification requirements would rule out successful matches. The two goals 
of the referrals – matching and monitoring – may call for different priorities in the 
process: the more monitoring is emphasized, the less focus should be directed at 
referring the job seeker to suitable vacancies.  
We examine how the vacancy referral process works and focus on three main 
questions. Do referrals lead to actual job applications? Does a “threat” of increased 
monitoring affect the probability of searching for a job that a worker is referred to? And 
how does this threat affect the duration of unemployment? To answer these questions, 
we have undertaken a randomized experiment based on a sample of vacancy referrals 
during the fall of 2007. Surveys to employers were used to get information about how 
often referrals lead to job applications. Some unemployed job seekers – the “treatment 
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groups” – were alerted (via letters from PES) to an increased risk of being monitored, 
i.e., an increased probability that their referral would be checked with the employer.  
We find that about one third of the referrals did not result in actual job applications. 
Information about increased monitoring resulted in a higher probability of job 
application. The average impact amounts to an increase in the job application rate by 4 
percentage points. The impact is most pronounced – 12 percentage points – among 
young people. However, there is no statistically significant impact on the duration of 
unemployment.  
We proceed by a brief overview of some related previous studies. Section 3 describes 
the experiment; section 4 discusses some theoretical issues; section 4 presents empirical 
results, and section 5 concludes. 
2  Previous studies  
We are unaware of previous studies that focus on vacancy referrals in the matching 
process. However, there are a number of related studies that deal with the effects of job 
search requirements and job search assistance (see Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2006, for 
a survey). Arguably, the most convincing evidence is based on work search experiments 
undertaken in the United States. One experiment was undertaken in the state of 
Washington in 1986–87 and is described in Johnson and Kleppinger (1994). Four 
different treatments were considered: (i) elimination of work-search requirement; (ii) 
standard requirement; (iii) individualized requirements; and (iv) intensive services. 
Individuals in the first category had essentially no search requirements. They were not 
required to report a specific number of employer contacts and UI payments were made 
automatically to claimants until they reported change of circumstance, such as return to 
work. The second category had requirements similar to what had been practiced in most 
states. Claimants had to make at least three employer contacts per week and those 
employers had to be listed on bi-weekly continued claims forms. Individuals in the third 
category were subject to work-search treatments tailored to specific circumstances of 
their occupation or local labor market. The fourth category had job search assistance 
early in the unemployment spell.  
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The study finds strong evidence that more stringent search requirements reduce the 
length of benefit receipt. Workers in the first category (no search requirements) had 
three weeks longer duration of benefit receipt than those with standard requirements. No 
search requirement also increased the risk of benefit exhaustion and increased the 
probability of being reemployed by the same employer. There is some evidence that 
workers in the first category had slightly higher reemployment wages in the short term, 
a finding consistent with higher reservation wages. However, there is no evidence of 
any longer-term effects on wages.  
Another experimental study was undertaken in Maryland in 1994 and is presented in 
Benus and Johnson (1997). Benefit claimants were randomly assigned to four treatment 
groups and two control groups. The control groups were required to follow the standard 
requirements at the time, including the report of at least two employer contacts per week 
(although without any verification of the contacts). Participants in one of the control 
groups were informed that they were part of an experimental study. The treatments were 
as follows: (i) increased work-search requirements by requiring workers to make at least 
four employer contacts per week; (ii) requiring two employer contacts per week but 
without any requirement of documentation; (iii) a requirement that workers should 
attend a four-day job search workshop early during the unemployment spell; and (iv) 
information to the claimants that their reported employer contacts would be verified.  
The results from the Maryland study suggest that increased search requirements can 
have non-trivial behavioral effects. Increasing the number of required employer contacts 
from two to four reduced the duration of benefit receipt by 6 percent. Informing 
claimants that their employer contacts would be verified reduced the duration of benefit 
receipt by 7.5 percent. Participation in the job search workshop reduced the number of 
benefit weeks by 5 percent, a finding broadly consistent with results from other 
experiments undertaken in the United States. The effect could reflect enhanced skills in 
job search but may also reflect higher perceived costs of remaining on UI (as the 
workshop reduces time available for leisure). In fact, the Maryland study suggests that 
the latter interpretation may be most plausible. The effect is largely driven by a sharp 
increase in exit rates from unemployment prior to the scheduled workshop.  
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A study by Ashenfelter et al. (2005) also reports results from randomized 
experiments intended to measure whether stricter enforcement and verification of job 
search activities reduce UI claims. The experiments were implemented in four states – 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Virginia and Tennessee – in 1984–85. The treatments 
included attempts to verify job search activities and also actual verifications (such as in 
depth interviews concerning the claimant’s search effort and in some cases contacts 
with employers). The study finds at most a very small effect on benefit payments.  
Dolton and O’Neill (1996) report evidence from the Restart experiments in the 
United Kingdom. Individuals with elapsed unemployment of six months were randomly 
assigned to participation in an interview to counsel them on active job search (the 
treatment group). Failure to attend the interview carried an explicit risk of losing 
benefits. The control group consisted of individuals that were not notified to attend an 
interview. The study reports that the notification of an interview had a statistically 
significant positive effect on exit rates to employment. The magnitude of the effect on 
the job exit rate is also substantial (around 30 percent). 
Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) report results from a small experiment 
undertaken at two local employment offices in the Netherlands. They discuss the 
tradeoff between formal and informal search, where formal search takes place via public 
employment offices and informal search involves other channels, such as gathering 
information from friends. The treatments entailed counseling as well as monitoring, 
both presumably affecting formal search. The study cannot find any support for the 
claim that monitoring and counseling raises the transition rate from unemployment to 
employment. The interpretation favored by the authors is that monitoring of formal 
search induced a substitution away from informal search channels.  
Recent work by Hägglund (2006) presents some Swedish randomized experiments 
that shed light on search requirements and search assistance in active labor market 
policy. Hägglund (2006) describes one of those experiments, where a randomly selected 
treatment group of job seekers was exposed to intensified monitoring and job search 
assistance. The combined effects of the two treatments were to substantially increase the 
rate of outflow from unemployment. The control of search intensity had no independent 
effect.  
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Some recent Swedish non-experimental studies have in part dealt with the role of 
vacancy referrals; see IAF (2006) and Riksrevisionen (2005). Both these studies 
conclude that referrals are rarely followed up. In 2005, the Swedish PES introduced new 
rules so as to increase the follow-up of vacancy referrals. Among other things, these 
rules involved random checks with employers to verify job applications. However, these 
rules have not been comprehensively implemented. A study by PES (AMS, 2007a) 
reveals that 15 percent of referred seekers had not sent in a job application (according to 
the employers) despite the fact that they stated that they had done so.  
3  Design and implementation of the study 
The practical implementation of the experiment was done by the Public Employment 
Service. The referrals in the study were randomly selected during a 9-week period in 
August and September 2007. A number of criteria had to be fulfilled in order to be 
included in the treatment groups: (i) An employer could appear at most once among the 
referrals (so as minimize the employer’s cost of participating). (ii) A job seeker could 
appear at most once in any of the treatment groups. (iii) Included referrals had a 
deadline for job application within (roughly) three weeks.
1 (iv) Only referrals pertaining 
to individuals qualified for unemployment benefits (UB) were considered since a non-
recipient faces no risk of benefit sanction.   
The sampling was made sequentially. Starting from the flow of all new referrals 
(about 10–15,000 each week) we apply conditions (iii) and (iv) above; this reduced the 
number of referrals to about 2–3,000. This group constitutes the population (P) of 
referrals in the study. In the next step all employers and individuals that had been drawn 
prior weeks were removed from the population. In the final steps conditions (i) and (ii) 
were applied to the remaining population: first random exclusion of all but one of the 
referrals pertaining to the same employer, then random exclusion of all but one of the 
referrals pertaining to the same individual. The population thus consists of all referrals 
that had an a priori chance of selection.  
                                                 
1 The formal criterion was that the “last day of publication” (at PES) should not exceed three weeks. In practice, this 
criterion typically coincides with the deadline for job application. 
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With these criteria applied, some 500 referrals were included each week. Individuals 
were randomly allocated to three treatment groups denoted A, B and C. Group A was 
subject to increased monitoring via surveys to employers so as to verify job applications 
associated with referrals. In addition, the members of this group were informed by letter 
that a referral to a job opening would most likely be followed up through employer 
contacts. See Appendix A for a description of the information letter. People in group B 
were also subject to increased monitoring via surveys to employers but no “advance 
warning” was given to them. Group C received the same information letter as group A, 
but no employer contacts took place. Group D is defined as the remaining population of 
referrals after group A, B and C have been removed, i.e. D=P-(A+B+C).  
The selection of referrals into the three groups was made each Friday between 
August 3 and September 28 (9 occasions in total). The letters to the job seekers were 
sent out as soon as the selection was made. The letters were expected to arrive 
approximately within a week after the individual had been given the referral. 
The survey to employers for group A and B was sent out shortly after the “last 
publication day” of the vacancy, which generally coincides with the last day for 
application. The timing was chosen so that the survey should arrive when the employer 
was actively handling the applications. The purpose was to reduce the effort of 
answering the survey and thereby increase the response rate. If the employer failed to 
answer the survey within a given time period, a reminder letter was sent out. 
In addition to the question about whether a person referred to a vacancy actually 
applied for the job, questions were also asked about whether an applicant had the 
necessary qualifications (“realistic” application), if she was offered the job and if she 
accepted or turned down the job.
2 The employer was also asked to report his subjective 
impression of whether or not the applicant appeared seriously interested in the job. See 
Appendix B. 
Table 1 shows how different samples are used in our analyses. When exploiting the 
employer survey we compare group A (treatment) with group B (control), conditional 
on receipt of unemployment benefits (UB) at some point between the date of the referral 
                                                 
2 Responses regarding job offers and job acceptances are not used since we have found that some employers 
interpreted these questions differently than others. 
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and the vacancy’s last day of publication. Receipt of UB includes individuals who 
receive compensation associated with participation in labor market programs. We 
observe from Table 1 that the response rates among groups A and B are virtually 
identical.  
In the analysis of unemployment duration we also use sample C; this group received 
the information letter but were not included in the employer survey. Unemployment 
duration is defined in terms of weeks of benefit receipt subsequent to the referral week. 
The treatment set consists of groups A and C and the control is group B. The analysis is 
conditioned on positive benefit receipt during the week when the referral was made.  
Table 1. Samples and response rates 
Sample Sample  usage  A  B  C  D 
          
Overall sample  Descriptive statistics  1504  1485  1506  22895 
          
Responses Never  used  948  947     
          
Response rate    0.63  0.64     
          
Response and some UB 
between referral and last day of 
publication 
Survey analysis   782  799     
          
Overall sample and some UB 
during referral week  Duration analysis  1148  1138  1118   
          
 
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics. The differences in means are negligible 
and statistically insignificant across the three groups A, B and C. A comparison with 
group D reveals that there are fewer men in D as well as more prior referrals.  
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for samples (A, B and C) and population (D) 
Variable A  B  C  D 
Male 0.48  0.50  0.51  0.43 
Age (years)  40.5  40.5  40.2  40.1 
Less than high school  0.21  0.22  0.21  0.19 
High school  0.48  0.47  0.49  0.48 
Some university education  0.31  0.32  0.30  0.33 
Number of prior referrals 2006 and 2007 4.18  4.02  4.33  5.22 
Elapsed duration of UB receipt (days)  129  128  130  136 
UB during referral period  0.82  0.84  0.82  0.85 
N 1504  1485  1506  22895 
Notes: The variables are dummies unless otherwise stated. “UB during referral period” is a dummy for some 
UB receipt between the date of the referral and the last publication date of the vacancy. 
4 Theoretical  issues 
We are interested in how intensified monitoring affects job applications and job 
findings. A positive impact on application rates is plausible, but it is not clear that this 
will translate into a positive impact on job findings. First, some applications are unlikely 
to meet the qualification requirements for the jobs; indeed, our survey indicates that 
only some 60 percent the applications were deemed “realistic” by the employers (see 
Table 3 below). Second, a higher propensity to adhere to formal search rules may come 
at the expense of informal search as discussed by van den Berg and van der Klaauw 
(2006). A worker who is induced to spend more time applying for referred vacancies 
may find less time to search via other channels, such as direct employer contacts. The 
link between job application and job finding is thus not immediate. In general, we 
expect that the impact on job finding should be weaker than the impact on application.  
The impact of intensified monitoring on formal and informal search can be illustrated 
by means of a simple partial equilibrium model.
3 Consider an unemployed worker who 
has access to two search channels, viz. formal and informal search. Informal search is 
                                                 
3 The model has similarities with the model in van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) but there are also 
differences. The job acceptance decision is trivial in our model since the wage offer distribution is degenerate by 
assumption. Our model focuses on vacancy referrals and the risk of a benefit sanction if search effort is deemed 
insufficient. 
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not effectively monitored so there is no risk of a benefit sanction as a result of limited 
search effort. Formal search takes place via vacancy referrals undertaken by PES and 
the worker runs a risk of losing benefits if she fails to apply to a referred job. Let   
denote search effort along the formal (i=1) and informal channel (i=2), respectively. Job 
offers via the informal channel arrive at the Poisson rate 
i s
2 s α , where α  is a measure of 
(exogenous) labor market conditions.  
Vacancy referrals arrive at the Poisson rate μ  and may result in a transition to work 
or a benefit sanction. Let  1 s μ λ  denote the probability per unit time of a job transition, 
where λ  is a measure of labor market conditions.
4 The analogous probability of being 
exposed to a benefit sanction is μπ , where  1 (;) s π πσ =  depends on search effort along 
the formal margin and the intensity of monitoring, σ . Holding monitoring constant, an 
increase in formal search should reduce the risk of being sanctioned. Holding formal 
search effort constant, an increase in monitoring should increase the sanction probability 
since more non-compliance is detected. We thus assume  1 0 π <  and  2 0 π > . We also 
assume  12 0 π <  which implies that a higher intensity of monitoring should increase the 
marginal return to search in terms of an increased probability of not being sanctioned. 
Let r denote the discount rate, E the expected present value of employment, U the 
value of unemployment and S the value of a sanction. There is no wage dispersion so 
workers always accept job offers. Assuming an infinite time horizon, we can write the 
value function as: 
 
(1)  12 1 1 2 (, ) ( ) (;) ( ) ( ) r U bc ss s EU s SU s EU μ λμ π σ α =− + − + − + −  
 
where  b is unemployment benefits and  is the search cost function. For 
simplicity, we normalize the value of a sanction to zero. The search cost function is 
increasing and strictly convex in each argument. In addition, an arguably plausible 
property is  . Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) make this assumption 
12 (, ) cs s
12 0 c >
                                                 
4 A natural benchmark is α λ = , but this equality need not hold if informal and formal search cover different 
segments of the labor market. In any case, this is irrelevant for the results. 
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arguing that “the efforts along the two channels are relatively similar activities 
compared to most other ways to spend time and money.” 
The first-order conditions for an interior solution are: 
 
(2)  [ ] 11 1 :( ) sc E U U μλ π 0 − +− − =
) 0
 
(3)  22 :( scE U α − +− =  
 
The first terms in (2) and (3) capture the marginal costs of search. The second terms 
capture the marginal returns to search along the formal and informal channels. Note that 
the marginal return to formal search involves terms associated with the gain from job 
finding,  () E U λ − , as well as the reduced risk of benefit sanction,  1 0 U π − > . Assume 
for simplicity that employment is an absorbing state and treat E as constant. The value 
of unemployment depends on the intensity of monitoring; a rise in σ  reduces the value 
of unemployment.
5 It is thus clear that intensified monitoring affects the marginal return 
to formal search (via  11 (;) s π σ and  () U σ ) as well as the marginal return to informal 
search (via  ( U ) σ ). Assuming that the second-order conditions are satisfied, 




12 22 1 22 12
s UU
sign sign Uc c c μπ μ λ π α
σσ




11 12 12 1 12
s UU
sign sign c Uc c αμ π μ λ π
σσ
∂ ∂∂ ⎡⎤ =− + + + ⎢⎥ ∂∂ ∂ ⎣⎦ σ
 
 
where  11 22 12 0, 0, 0 ccπ >>< ,  / U 0 σ ∂ ∂< and (probably)  . The signs of 
these expressions are ambiguous in general but the mechanisms are intuitive. The first 
term in the bracket of (4) is positive and captures that the marginal return to formal 
search increases via stronger incentives to avoid a sanction since 
12 0 c >
12 0 π < . The second 
                                                 
[ ] [ ] 12 1 2 () / () Ub c s E s Ers s μ λα μ λ μπ =− + + + + +    α 0 / U σ ∂ ∂<
5 Use (1) to obtain  , where   since 
2 0 π > . 
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term in the bracket of (4) incorporates the impact via the value of unemployment; the 
term cannot be signed since  1 λ π +  can take either sign. The third term in (4) is negative 
and captures interactions between formal and informal search via the search cost 
function: an increase in informal search increases the marginal cost of formal search 
(and vice versa) if formal and informal search are “relatively similar activities” in the 
sense that  .   12 0 c >
The impact of monitoring on informal search works via the value of unemployment 
and thereby the marginal return to search,  () E U α − . The first term in (5) is positive 
since  U /0 σ ∂∂ <  and thus  () /0 EU ∂− σ ∂ > . Intensified monitoring would thus tend 
to increase informal search. However, this effect is counteracted by the second and 
possibly the third term. The second term is negative as long as  .   12 0 c >
Summing up, it is not clear how intensified monitoring of vacancy referrals will 
affect formal and informal search. The overall impact on job finding, which depends on 
both types of search activities, is ambiguous. The properties of the search cost and 
monitoring technologies are crucial for the outcomes. Empirical evidence on these 
properties is, unfortunately, close to nonexistent.  
5 Empirical  results 
5.1 The  survey 
Some basic results from the employer survey are reported in Table 3. Over 30 percent of 
referrals did not result in job applications. This number may perhaps appear to be on the 
high side but the lack of previous studies cautions against strong priors about what is 
reasonable or not. 
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Table 3. The survey results 
Question Group  Yes  No  Unknown or 
uncertain  N 
          
 A  0.68  0.32    782 
Applied for 
the job  B 0.64  0.36   799 
  t (A-B)  1.65       
          
 A  0.65  0.10  0.25  530 
Interested in 
the job  B 0.64  0.08  0.28  510 
  t (A-B)  0.46  1.00  -1.14   
          
 A  0.59  0.16  0.25  530 
Realistic 
application  B 0.58  0.15  0.27  510 
  t (A-B)  0.15  0.42  -0.51   
Notes: The t-statistics test for equality of the means.  
 
There is a presumption that the reliability should be higher for positions in the public 
sector since those employers are required to keep records on job applications. However, 
when we look separately on jobs that most likely pertain to the public sector, we find 
roughly the same rate of non-compliance. Moreover, a small survey to employers 
undertaken by PES during 2008 found that about 25 percent of the referrals did not 
result in job applications. 
5.2  The impact of information on search behavior  
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of how the “threat” of a referral follow-up 
influences the probability of job application. We expect that those exposed to 
information about a probable follow-up would be more prone to obey the rules and 
apply for the job (although the theory is somewhat ambiguous about the direction of the 
effect). 
By and large, this presumption is confirmed by the data; see Table 4. The application 
rate is 4 percentage points higher in treatment group A than in the B control. However, 
the difference is only marginally significant. The estimate and the standard errors are 
unaffected by the inclusion of control variables in the second column.  
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Table 4. Estimates of treatment effects. Dependent variable: Did the individual apply for 
the job? (Yes=1, No=0) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept  0.638 
(0.017)        
         
Treatment (A)  0.039* 
(0.024) 
0.040* 
(0.024)      
         
A and few previous 
referrals      0.059* 
(0.035)    
         
A and some previous 
referrals     0.049 
(0.047)    
         
A and many previous 





         
A and short 
unemployment 
history 
     0.105*** 
(0.033)   
         
A and intermediate 
unemployment 
history 
     -0.064 
(0.047)   
         
A and long 
unemployment 
history 
     0.010 
(0.049)   
         
A and age ≤  30       0.119** 
(0.051) 
         
A and age >30          0.018 
(0.027) 
         
Other controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  (%)  0.17 1.53  1.86 2.18  1.73 
N  1581 1581  1581 1581  1581 
Notes: The estimation is by OLS. Standard errors are in the parentheses. Significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%. 
Previous referrals (during 2006 and 2007): few (0, 1); some (2, 3, 4); many (5 or more). Unemployment history 
is measured as days of UB receipt. Short history (< 100 days); intermediate (100 – 250); long (>250 days). The 
standard set of “other controls” include age, gender, level of education, number of previous referrals, and days of 
UB receipt. In the models with interactions we also include controls for the baseline effects of the variables that 
are interacted with the treatment dummy.  
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The three last columns of the table include results from alternative specifications. We 
consider interactions between treatment status and three indicators of labor market 
experience, namely the number of previous referrals, elapsed duration of unem-
ployment, and age. The broad pattern that emerges is that labor market “inexperience” 
is associated with stronger responsiveness to the information treatment. In particular, 
those who are young or have short previous unemployment spells appear highly 
responsive; the estimates imply an impact on the application rate of 11 or 12 percentage 
points. We have also examined if the treatment effects vary by gender and education 
(not shown in Table 5). We find a significant effect for men (7 percentage points) but 
not for women. There is some evidence the effect is higher for individuals with 
relatively low education although the differences are only marginally significant.  
An intriguing question is why those with relatively little labor market experience 
appear to be the most responsive. We speculate that the results may reflect differential 
assessments of the information letter’s implicit threat of benefit sanction. The 
“objective” risk of benefit sanction has been very low in Sweden: on average around 
0.45 sanctions per month out of 100 benefit recipients took place in 2005, 2006 and 
2007.  Older individuals and those with experiences of long spells of unemployment 
have presumably learned that the risk of benefit sanction is very low, despite strict 
formal rules, and adjusted their behavior accordingly. For these groups, a reminder of 
the rules may not have much impact on the perceived sanction probability. However, 
those who have recently been introduced to the UI rules, including the rules that apply 
to vacancy referrals, may be more inclined to take seriously the wordings of the 
information letter. 
5.3  The impact of information on unemployment duration 
As discussed above, it is not obvious that a positive impact of monitoring on job 
application will also imply a positive impact on job finding. Some applications are 
unlikely to meet the qualification requirements for the jobs. We have also noted that 
intensified monitoring of formal search may reduce workers’ informal search.  
We examine how the information treatment has affected subsequent UB receipt 
rather than job finding; the UB data are arguably of higher quality than the data on job 
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finding. The data on UB receipt include benefit information on a daily basis. A 
transition out of unemployment is defined as non-receipt of UB during a whole week; 
the results are insensitive to alternative definitions, such as non-receipt during two 
weeks.  
The treatment we are interested in is unlikely to have a permanent impact on job 
finding. The information letter specified explicitly the time frame of the referral 
experiment (August 15 to October 15, 2007). Referrals outside this period should thus 
not be subject to intensified follow-ups. However, it is conceivable that these dates are 
not well recalled at later dates. To the extent that individuals perceive a general increase 
in the likelihood of being exposed to a follow-up, the information letter may well have 
more long term effects on job finding. Ultimately, this is an empirical question.  
 
We have studied the impact on unemployment duration through several approaches. 
First, we ran Cox regressions to explain exits from unemployment during a period that 
ends in week 14, 2008. At that date, only 16 percent of the spells were right-censored. 
Second, we ran a number of OLS regressions explaining the probability of remaining on 
UB after x weeks after the referral, where x is 4, 8 and 12. That is, we focus on the labor 
market state relatively close to the referral period on the assumption that the information 
letter should have the strongest impact close to this period. For both of these 
approaches, we allowed for interaction terms along the lines of those in Table 4. 
The results from the Cox regressions are shown in Table 5, whereas the results from 
the OLS regressions are shown in Appendix C. We do not find any significant treatment 
effects in any of these specifications. Thus, there is no evidence that advance warning 
about intensified follow-ups of referrals has any positive (or negative) impact on 
unemployment duration. The precise reasons for this result are unclear but we have 
emphasized that an impact on job application need not automatically imply an impact 
on job finding. The result may reflect a substitution of away from informal towards 
formal search. However, absent data on search this can be no more than a speculation.  
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Table 5. COX regressions of unemployment duration  
   (1)  (2)  (2)  (4)  (5) 
Treatment (A)  0.011 
(0.040) 
0.007 
(0.040)      
          
A and few previous 
referrals     0.024 
(0.060)    
          
A and some previous 
referrals     0.024 
(0.077)    
          
A and many previous 
referrals     -0.032 
(0.073)    
          
A and short 
unemployment history      -0.042 
(0.057)   
          
A and medium 
unemployment history       0.048 
(0.079)   
          
A and long 
unemployment history       0.078 
(0.077)   
          
A and age≤30         -0.027 
(0.077) 
          
A and age>30          0.022 
(0.046) 
Other controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 3404  3404  3404  3404  3404 
Notes: Unemployment duration is measured as weeks of UB receipt subsequent to the referral week. 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. See notes to Table 4 for details about the variables. The duration 
data are censored at week 14, 2008, where 16 percent of the spells are right-censored. 
6 Concluding  remarks 
We have presented results from a randomized labor market experiment where job search 
among the unemployed are subject to intensified monitoring. The treatment involves 
information that PES will most likely contact the employer in order to verify job 
applications associated with vacancy referrals. We find that the threat of referral follow-
ups causes an increase in job application rates, especially among young people. 
However, we find no impact on unemployment duration. 
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The possibility that intensified monitoring of formal search may have little impact on 
total search raises some doubts about the efficacy of such policies. However, there is so 
far rather limited evidence on the empirical relevance of this possibility. If similar 
experiments are undertaken in the future, it would be valuable to incorporate collection 
of more comprehensive data of job search activities.  
Our study has focused on how the threat of benefit sanction affects search effort. 
Monitoring of job search can also affect workers’ reservation wages and thereby their 
propensity to accept job offers. A complete analysis of monitoring and work-search 
requirements must consider the impact on job acceptance decisions along with the 
analysis of search effort. 
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Appendix A. The letter to groups A and C 
Monitoring of job referrals 
 
You have been selected for a specific follow up of job referrals. The follow up pertains 
to referrals between August 15 and October 15 2007. If you are referred to a vacancy 
during this period, the Public Employment Service will with high probability contact the 
employer regarding your application.  
The fact that you have been selected has nothing to do with earlier referrals that you 
might have received. The selection was random and covered the whole country. 
The purpose is to study the Public Employment Service’s referrals to vacancies. The 
result of the study will be processed and handled confidentially.  
If you receive unemployment benefits you are required to apply for referred jobs 
according to the rules regarding unemployment insurance.  
Questions may be sent to anvisningsstudie@ams.amv.se 
Or call the Public Employment Service’s customer service, 010 – 487 24 76.  




The Public Employment Service 
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Appendix B. The survey to employers 
 
1.  Did the job seeker apply for the referred job? 
  Yes  
  No >>>>> exit survey  
   
2.  Did you get the impression that the applicant was seriously interested in the job? 
  Yes  
  No 
  Uncertain  
  Do not know, lack of information 
  Comment:………………………….  
   
3.  Was the referral realistic in the sense that the applicant met the formal/informal 
qualifications?  
  Yes  
  No  
  Uncertain  
  Do not know, lack of information 
  Comment:……………………………  
4.  Did the applicant get the job?  
  Yes  
  No  
  Vacancy not yet filled 
  Comment:……………………………  
   
5.  If the answer on the fourth question was “No”: Why didn’t the applicant get the job?  
  He/she turned down the job 
  It was offered to another applicant 
  Comment:……………………………………  
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Appendix C. Further results on unemployment 
duration 
 
Table C 1. OLS regression explaining the probability of UB receipt 4 weeks after 
referral 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept  0.772  
(0.012)      
Treatment (A)  0.000  
(0.015) 
0.000 
(0.015)     
          
A and few previous 
referrals     0.028 
(0.023)    
A and some previous 
referrals     -0.040 
(0.029)    
A and many previous 
referrals     -0.005 
(0.028)    
          
A and short 
unemployment history       0.020 
(0.021)   
A and medium 
unemployment history       -0.020 
(0.030)   
A and long 
unemployment history       -0.014 
(0.029)   
          
A and age≤30         0.000 
(0.031) 
A and age>30          0.000  
0.017) 
Other controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 3404  3404  3404  3404  3404 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See also Table 4. 
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Table C 2. OLS regression explaining the probability of UB receipt 8 weeks 
after referral 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept  0.686 
(0.014)        
Treatment (A)  -0.011 
(0.017) 
-0.010 
(0.017)     
         
A and few previous 
referrals     -0.004 
(0.025)    
A and some previous 
referrals     -0.035 
(0.033)    
A and many 
previous referrals     0.002 
(0.031)    
         
A and short 
unemployment 
history 
    -0.001 
(0.024)   
A and intermediate 
unemployment 
history 
    -0.016 
(0.034)   
A and long 
unemployment 
history 
    -0.024 
(0.033)   
         
A and age≤30        -0.032 
(0.035) 
A and age>30          -0.004 
(0.019) 
Other controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 3404  3404  3404  3404  3404 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See also Table 4. 
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Table C 3. OLS regression explaining the probability of UB receipt 12 weeks after 
referral 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept  0.590 
(0.015)      
Treatment (A)  0.003 
(0.018) 
0.003 
(0.018)     
       
A and few previous  
referrals     0.006 
(0.027)    
A and some previous 
referrals     0.008 
(0.034)    
A and many previous  
referrals     -0.007 
(0.033)    
       
A and short  
unemployment history      0.010 
(0.025)   
A and intermediate  
unemployment history      -0.009 
(0.035)   
A and long  
unemployment history      -0.005 
(0.034)   
       
A and age≤30       0.010 
(0.036) 
A and age>30          0.000 
(0.020) 
Other  controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  3404 3404 3404 3404 3404 
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